Published: 9 December 2024. Writer: Nicola Sharman
This year’s 29th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – COP29 – concluded in bitter disappointment for many states and observers. Behind the conference outcomes and politics, frustrations have been widely expressed about the COP process itself. This blog reflects on why the process may need to evolve to deliver ambition.
The letdown of COP29
The history of the climate COPs is punctuated with both perceived failures (e.g. COP15, Copenhagen, 2009) and successes (e.g. adoption of the Paris Agreement at COP21, Paris, 2015). COP29 has been widely judged to fall into the failure category. Disappointment has mostly revolved around the new collective quantified goal for climate finance. The figure of $300 billion per year by 2035 adopted in the final decision fell far short of the $1.3 trillion target that developing countries and civil society groups had been pushing for.
Progress was still made in some areas. Carbon market rules, for instance, were finally agreed after almost 10 years. But agreement could not be reached on other texts, including on how last year’s Global Stocktake should inform the next round of National Determined Contributions (NDCs), the Mitigation Work Programme, the Just Transition Work Programme, and elements of Loss and Damage. (See Carbon Brief for full breakdown.)
COP in context: what is its mandated role?
The COP is more than an annual meeting of states to discuss global climate action. It is an institutional body, established under the UNFCCC and composed of all state parties, mandated to keep under review and promote the effective implementation of the climate treaties (UNFCCC, art 7; Paris Agreement, art 16). COPs have been understood as autonomous bodies with their own legal personality (see discussion here).
The precise type of activities and decisions the COP needs to make in exercising this mandate is shaped by the structure, history and requirements of the treaty. The climate COPs now revolve around the 2015 Paris Agreement, which has been pioneering in its attempt to strike a political balance between state sovereignty and collective responsibility. The Agreement’s defining feature is that it does not impose quantifiable targets on individual states, but is built around procedural obligations and its ‘ambition mechanism’. The parties are expected to lodge national commitments (NDCs) in five-year cycles reflecting their highest possible ambition, according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and informed by global stocktakes of collective progress.
COP evolution under the Paris Agreement
The last 10 years of the COPs have been focused on fleshing out the complex rules and technicalities of how the Agreement should operate in practice. The ‘Paris Rulebook’ was adopted in 2018, and other elements such as reporting requirements, carbon market rules, and the loss and damage fund, for example, have followed.
But now the rules are more or less settled, and the central role of the climate COPs is shifting into a new ‘era of implementation’. We are in the midst of the first test of the ambition mechanism, the first global stocktake having taken place last year and the next round of NDC updates due in February. The COP’s main job now is to oversee the effective operation of the ambition mechanism to secure progressively ambitious state commitments according to the Agreement’s principles, and ensure their translation into concrete action.
COP in the era of implementation
The flexibility offered by the Paris Agreement means that the COP must continue to navigate deeply entrenched global climate politics characterised by North / South divisions and the meaning of CBDR. This year saw the return of familiar themes, such as the insistence of India and China to remain classified as developing countries, and obstructive negotiation tactics by Saudi Arabia. The recent US election also loomed over Baku, with reports that this was used as a negotiating chip to push through the finance deal.
But the COP process, particularly within a system dependent on self-determined contributions, has a vital role to play in cutting through politics. It has a bearing on time management and efficiency, how different actors are able to participate, how information is shared, how parties are held to account, how disputes are resolved, and how ambitions come to be reflected in adopted texts. These are essential building blocks of trust, legitimacy and collaboration, which facilitate ambition.
Key criticisms
The underwhelming progress made at COP29 adds weight to an open letter – signed by a number of prominent figures including former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres – which judged the COP process to be ‘no longer fit for purpose’ to deliver change at sufficient speed and scale. Key criticisms include:
1. Inefficiency. COPs only meet once a year, with a huge agenda packed into two-weeks. The modest progress achieved in Baku, amidst reports that the global goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees is now unattainable, demonstrates how misaligned this is with the urgency of the climate crisis.
2. Consensus decision-making. Consensus decision-making is used in practice (full history here), which arguably means that outputs will only ever reflect the lowest ambition of 196 parties. COP29’s closing plenary brought voting issues to the fore when India lodged a passionate objection to the decision after the gavel was dropped.
3. Weak role of science. Accountability mechanisms to link national commitments with latest scientific advice are weak. Such disconnects were arguably apparent in Baku when Saudi Arabia refused to incorporate language referring to the need to transition away from fossil fuels, despite this being agreed in a previous COP decision and strongly supported by latest IPCC reports.
4. Presidency selection. Appointment of inexperienced or unambitious countries to hold the position, a critical leadership role, has drawn disapproval. Azerbaijan’s appointment was influenced by politics in Eastern Europe, but the country’s petrostate status, detention of environmental activists and evidence of malpractice affected the tone of COP29.
5. Representation. The COPs attract huge numbers of people (approx. 50,000 attended Baku), generating competition for access and influence that favours powerful actors. It was reported that 1,773 lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry were present this year, outnumbering many delegations of vulnerable countries.
Are reforms feasible?
Climate multilateralism is not easy amongst 196 sovereign states. Many would argue that the COP process simply reflects global political and economic realities, with little prospect for change. But the Paris Agreement is taking us into unchartered territory of international cooperation. To avoid the COPs turning into endless talk shops, a purposive lens and imaginative approach could help identify new design options to support accelerated ambition that converts into concrete action.
Proposals in the open letter include developing selection criteria for presidencies, conflict of interest disclosure requirements, creating a permanent scientific body, and better climate finance tracking. Other proposals by scholars include introducing a supermajority voting rule for certain decisions, optional annex agreements for more ambitious parties that could build membership over time (see this recent paper by Joanna Depledge), or restructuring to focus on individual sectoral systems (see this paper by Obergassel et al).
Although building support for these kinds of proposals would likely be challenging, they should be given serious consideration.
Nicola Sharman is a PhD Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland. Her work forms part of the 2035Legitimacy project and will explore the legitimacy dimensions of international climate decision-making processes.